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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the -core of a Bayesian game. We con-
sider a game in which players have private information at the time of forming a coa-
lition.
In exchange economies with incomplete information Vohra (1999) and Forges and
Minelli (2001) investigated an incentive compatible core. Forges (2004) studied as-
signment games. In these papers each member in a coalition exchanges information
with others when a coalition is formed. They studied the non-emptiness of the ex
ante incentive compatible core.
In exchange economies and assignment games, members of a coalition are not af-
fected by actions outside the coalition. When actions outsid e a coalition affect mem-
bers of the coalition, the -core, given by Aumann and Peleg (1960), is an
appropriate notion to study players' cooperation. Scarf (1971) gave a suffcient condi-
tion under which the -core be non-empty. Yannelis (1991) considered strategic form
games with incomplete information and proved the non-emptiness of the ex ante -
core. In his paper, however, each member in a coalition does not exchange informa-
tion even if the coalition is formed, and incentive constraints are not taken into
consideration.
We would like to consider a Bayesian game where each member exchanges infor-
mation with others. When the members exchange information, it is possible that they
do not report truth-fully. Therefore, we need to consider incentive conditions on a
Bayesian game. This paper gives several suffcient conditions for non-emptiness of the
ex ante -core with incentive constraints. Our core concept can be applied to econ-
omy with externalities.
The next section describes the model and the scenario of a Bayesian game. In sec-
tion 3 we define -incentive compatibility and ex ante -incentive compatible core.
We also give suffcient conditions under which the ex ante -incentive compatible
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core is non-empty in two person Bayesian games. Section 4 analyzes an example: a
public good game. Finally, section 5 concludes this paper with some remarks.
2 The model
Let be a set of players. We denote by N the set of all non-empty
subset of . Now we define a Bayesian game.
Definition 1. A Bayesian game is a list of specified data, , where
(1)  is a set of strategies for player ,
(2)  is a finite set of player 's types,
(3) 	 			 is player 's utility function, and
(4) is the objective probability on .
For notational convenience, let

and

for all
NMoreover,
we denote    and 
		.
Now we assume the following:
Assumption 1.
For each is a non-empty, convex and compact subset of
and is
continuous for all .
Considering cooperation among 
, we assume that all feasible collective decisions of

can be represented as the outcomes of a feasible direct mechanism, which we now
define precisely.
Definition 2. The set of feasible direct mechanisms for coalition 
 is denoted by


, that is, 

	 


measurable.
Here, 
-measurability of 

 means that 
 is measurable with respect to 
,
where 
, and 
 is the coarsest common refinement of

. Intuitively, 
-measurability of 

 implies that 
 is dependent upon only


.
For simplicity, the -th component of the projection of 
 is denoted as 
.
Remark 1.
By the revelation principle (see Appendix), mechanisms can be restricted to direct
ones without loss of generality.
We assume that each coalition is formed at the ex ante stage, that is, before each
player knows her/his type. By considering mechanisms, a Bayesian game is imple-
mented according to the following scenario:
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1. A coalition structure is formed, where a coalition structure is a parti-
tion of .
2. Each coalition  chooses a mechanism 

.
3. Every player  is informed of her/his true type 	.
4. Each player  reports a types 
	to 
, and  determines thereafter a
profile 

of strategies. (It is not necessary that each player reports
her/his true type.)
In this paper we consider -core. Thus it is suffcient to consider only the coalition
structure . The reason is that by joining two coalitions, members of both
coalitions can use more strategies. Namely, for  and  , we
define a mechanism  for  as follows:

 
 	








if 


if 
Then   , because this mechanism satisfies  -measurability.
3 Ex ante -incentive compatible core
We consider an incentive condition in a Bayesian game. Let be 's true type and

be 's reported type. Then the interim expected utility for player is





	 
	







Definition 3. The mechanism  satisfies -incentive compatibility if for all



, all, and all , 
	,




 




.
This means that no player in coalition has an incentive to tell false types no mat-
ter which mechanisms coalition chooses.
Definition 4. The set of feasible and -incentive compatible mechanisms for  is de-
noted by , i.e., 	satisfies incentive -compatibility.
In a similar way to Definition 2,  is the -th component of the projection of

.
Because each coalition chooses a mechanism at the ex ante stage, each player's
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utility should be measured by ex ante expected one. The ex ante expected utility of
player is




 

	




 

	




where 	 is the marginal probability of .
Definition 5. For each N, we define ex ante -incentive compatible effectiveness
as follows:



 	










R

 




Roughly speaking, ex ante -incentive compatible effectiveness means that  can
assure itself of 
independently of the actions of . Now we would like
to consider the most pessimistic expectation with respect to the actions of . Thus
we adopt  in the definition instead of .
In the same way as Aumann and Peleg (1960), we define the core concept.
Definition 6. Ex ante -incentive compatible core 
is



 


	
N
int 
.
Theorem 1.
Under Assumption 1, the ex ante -incentive compatible core is non-empty in a two-
person Bayesian game.
Proof. In a two-person game, the only non-empty non-grand coalitions are the two
singletons. Hence, 




, where  is an element of ex ante -
incentive compatible core if and only if   for ＝1, 2 and there does not exist



 such that  

 for ＝1, 2, where maxmin




for  .
First we show that there exists 


such that   for ＝1, 2. We
define a mechanisas a maximizer of min 





for  .
Let and  

for ＝1, 2. Then , because this
mechanism satisfies feasible conditions and -incentive compatibility. It is also shown
that   for ＝1, 2.
Under the topological assumptions we can choose 	for which 



and there does not exist 


such that for ＝1, 2.
It is suffcient to define as  for such .
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Remark 2.
By the definition of , it is easily shown that ex ante -incentive compatible
core is non-empty in case  . However,  does not nec-
essarily holds even if the number of players is two as the following example shows:
Example 1. Suppose there are two players. Let and . Then the
set of type-profile  is identified with . We assume that  

	. The
set of strategies is given by 	
fo reach 	＝1, 2. The utility functions are as
follows:

 


,




.
We can easily show that 

by considering the following
mechanism 	





.
Note that  is the only feasible mechanism which leads to this expected utility pro-
file. But  violates -incentive compatibility. Thus  .
4 A public good game
In this section we provide an example in which there exists the ex ante -
incentive compatible core in -person Bayesian games. We consider a public good
game. Letbe the set of players. Several players jointly produce a certain
public good. To this end, each of them contributes some amount of input
	
, where  is suffciently large. The productivity of players except
player 1 is common knowledge, whereas that of player 1 is private information.
Suppose that player 1 has  types, while the other players do not have private infor-
mation, that is, and 			. Then the set of type-profile
		is identified with . We assume that for all without loss
of generality.
All players decide simultaneously how much to contribute to the production of the
public good. Once their decisions have been made, the output produced is given by
the production function 		, where  is the player 1's true type. The play-
ers' utility functions are of the form 
	 			 for 	
and . For simplicity, we denote as 		 and 

		
 for 	

		
with an abuse of notation.
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We assume that , , 

	, and 
	
for all
 as usual.
Proposition 1
In this game ex ante 	-incentive compatible core is non-empty.
Proof. First we characterize as a benchmark. In this situation can be
characterized by the maximum value of the sum of each player's (ex ante) expected
utility. We subsequently denote the maximum value as ; that is,




	








.
We calculate , which is given by the following;



	















Thus the mechanism  maximizes the sum of the expected utility if for each
 it solves
















The optimal mechanism  therefore satisfies the necessary and suffcient first-order
condition





 

  (1)
for every .
Now we define a symmetric mechanism for grand coalition, , as follows:





 for all 
. Let 



. We prove that 
 is an ex
ante 	-incentive compatible mechanism. In order to prove this, it is suffcient to show
that (a) and (b) .
(a) This mechanism clearly satisfies first-order conditions. Thus it is suffcient to
show that this mechanism satisfies 	-incentive compatibility, i.e., 	. Here,


	

 

 










 





s.t.  


 


 






and
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








 




where  

 	and 

 

 	

. It can be shown 
 

 if 
 

.
By joining above two inequalities,
	




 










 























. (2)
Because is concave, we can show (2) noting that 	  



.
Therefore, this mechanism satisfies -incentive compatibility. Hence, 	.
(b) Suppose that 	 . Then there exists   such that 	int
. For such , we define as follows:
	













where  is a mechanism such that  ＝0 for all and . In order
to calculate , we construct a mechanism for which maximizes






 









.
Consider the case in which 1(that is,  is -measurable). Then the first-order
condition is







for each . Therefore, if iS 

 

 	, the sum is maximized. We
denote this value as . By concavity of , it can be shown that   with equal-
ity if  . Then .
On the other hand, if  since 
 is not
-measurable.
In both cases .
Since 	int, there exists a mechanism 
 such that
	 



for all  (3)
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Hence,
(3)  

 






 	



	




 



		



s.t. 	


	

 	

 (4)
If  , it is easily shown that this inequality does not hold. Thus we subse-
quently consider only the case  . For this 
,
(4)  	


	

 	


	

because
	












But this contradicts concavity of note that  
.
Next we compare the productivity of ex ante -incentive compatible core with that
of Bayesian Nash equilibria. Calculating a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we can get the
sum of all players' contribution as 
 
for each 
. On the other hand, the
sum of all players' contribution in ex ante -incentive compatible core is 
 

for each 
 from (1). Because 


 is strictly decreasing, we can obtain the follow-
ing result:
Remark 3.
The productivity of a public good in ex ante -incentive compatible core is greater
than that in Bayesian Nash equilibria.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we investigated players' cooperative behavior in Bayesian game and
imposed incentive constraints. We showed that the ex ante -incentive compatible
core is non-empty if there exist only two players. We also considered a public good
game and shown that the symmetric mechanism was an ex ante -incentive compati-
ble core mechanism.
We should also consider the case in which decisions are made at the interim stage.
This case covers a used-car market. We can list various interim core concepts since
some communication is allowed at the coalition formation stage. Thus it is important
to define core concepts carefully.
In the case where incentive constraints are not imposed, ex ante -core is non-
empty if each player has a quasi-concave utility function as shown in Hirase and
Utsumi (2004). However, it is still not solved whether ex ante -incentive compatible
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core is non-empty if each player's utility is quasi-concave but not linear. In addition,
it is necessary to consider suffcient conditions other than requirements of utility func-
tion; for example, we may alter the definition of ex ante -incentive compatible effec-
tiveness.
A Revelation principle
In this appendix, we consider the revelation principle. Because we have to take
into consideration actions of players outside of coalition, we can not directly apply
Myerson (1979) to the problem analyzed in this paper. In order to obtain the result
similar to Myerson, we prepare some concepts. Let be player 's message space
and  be player 's strategy for each . Here  satisfies -
measurability. For notational convenience, we denote and .
Note that  is -measurable. For coalition ,   is a mechanism.
In order to define the equilibrium concept, we denote interim expected utility of
player as
	
	 


		

Definition 7. The strategic profile , which satisfies -measurability, is an -
Bayesian Nash equilibrium if
	

	
		 	

	
		
for all 
		, all , and all .
Definition 8.  implements  in -Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there exists an
-Bayesian Nash equilibrium of , 

, such that 



for all .
Theorem 2.
Suppose that there exists a mechanism  that implements the mechanism 



in -Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then  is -incentive compatible.
Proof. If  implements 


 in -Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then there exists a
profile of strategies  such that 



 for all , and for all and all
,
	



	
		 	

	
		
for all .
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Therefore, for all and all ,




	
 

	

		

for all , where  is 's reported type. Note that 




	.
Since 




for all , this means that, for all and all ,


	
 

		

for all Ti and all 	

.
Since 

, we can get -incentive compatible conditions.
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― Abstract―
We consider ex ante -core with incentive constraints on a Bayesian game. We
give several a suffcient condition in a two-person Bayesian game under which ex
ante -incentive compatible core is non-empty, that is, there exists an ex ante -
incentive compatible core mechanism. Moreover we investigate the non-emptiness of
the -incentive compatible core in the Bayesian public goods game.
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